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One of the most significant issues currently confronting the
criminal justice system is the development of effective safeguards
against unreliable eyewitness identification. In response to this
problem, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in United States
v. TelfaireI proposed a set of model instructions which trial judges
may employ in focusing juror attention on the issues surrounding
eyewitness testimony. Although these instructions do not describe
recent psychological research that documents the numerous factors
which limit the accuracy of eyewitnesses,2 nevertheless they high-
light the reasons a juror should evaluate such testimony carefully.
Judicial commentary, along with expert witness testimony and de-
fense counsel's cross-examination, represents a potentially impor-
tant safeguard against false eyewitness testimony.
Since the Telfaire decision, several other courts have adopted
model instructions for cases involving eyewitness testimony.3 Unfor-
tunately there is no research investigating the impact ofjudicial cau-
tionary instructions about eyewitness testimony. Accordingly, this
Article begins to clarify the relationship between this form of judi-
cial commentary and the process of jury decision making.
* Professor of Psychology, Reed College. Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley,
1965; B.A., Stanford University, 1958.
** Graduate student, University of Pittsburgh. B.A., Reed College, 1982.
1 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2 See E. LovrTs, EYEwINESS TESTIMONY (1979); Penrod, Loftus & Winkler, The Reli-
ability of Eyewitness Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (N. Kerr & R. Bray
eds. 1982).
3 The evidence from a series of recent mock jury experiments indicates that the
effect ofjudicial instructions varies widely, with virtually no assurance that members of
the jury will follow them.
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II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON JUROR RESPONSE
TO JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS
Previous research on the impact of judicial instructions on jury
behavior has focused on substantive and procedural matters, such as
the definition of the criminal charge and the burden of proof, as well
as on evidential issues, such as the admissibility of hearsay evidence
or the role of the defendant's prior record in determining guilt.
4
Perhaps the limited impact of such instructions can be attributed
partly to the difficulty many jury members have in understanding
the instructions. For example, jurors find substantive and proce-
dural instructions overly complex and, more often than not, confus-
ing.5 Furthermore, approximately 45% of the important elements
in the recently formulated patterned jury instructions are not under-
stood by jury members.
6
Another factor which limits the effectiveness ofjudicial instruc-
tion is that they usually are presented at the end of the trial. Studies
have shown that jurors are more likely to comprehend instructions
on the relevant substantive law if they are presented at the begin-
ning of the trial, as well as at the end. 7 These studies also have
found that presenting instructions on the burden of proof before
the presentation of the evidence, rather than afterwards, tends to
reduce the rate of jury convictions. 8 It is reported that instructing
jurors with a stringent reasonable doubt criterion led to the lowest
percentage of guilty verdicts, followed, in turn, by no mention of the
criterion and a fairly lax definition. Thus, research on the impact of
substantive and procedural instructions is inconclusive: in some
cases, these instructions are followed; in others, their influence de-
pends on important structural factors; while in still others, they sim-
ply are not comprehended.
Researchers have had similar results with the impact of judicial
instructions concerning the relevance of certain kinds of evidence.
4 See Elwork, Sales & Alfini,Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, I
LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 163 (1977); Strawn & Buchanan,Juiy Confision: A Thread ofJustice,
59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976).
5 At the present time, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the efficacy ofjury
instructions.
6 See Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study ofJury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306 (1979).
7 Elwork, Sales & Alfini, supra note 4; Kassin & Wrightman, On the Requirements of
Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instrnction and Aock Juror Verdicts, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 1877 (1979).
8 See Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects
of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on theJndgment of MockJurors, 34J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCH. 282 (1976).
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For example, Simon concluded that a judge's admonitions to disre-
gard damaging pre-trial publicity were effective in modifying jury
members' pre-trial beliefs. 9 Also, Cornish and Sealy found that ju-
dicial instructions led to fewer guilty verdicts when jurors were told
to disregard evidence concerning the defendant's prior conviction
record. 10
On the other hand, another study reported a series of experi-
ments in which jurors who received information about the defend-
ant's prior offenses were more likely to judge the defendant guilty
than those who did not have this information, even when they were
instructed by the judge to disregard the defendant's prior criminal
record."1 Similarly, Sue, Smith, and Caldwell found that, when a
case against the defendant is weak, jury members apparently do not
disregard inadmissible evidence concerning an illegal wiretap. 12
Furthermore, Wolf and Montgomery determined that when mock
jury members received a strong admonition to disregard inadmissi-
ble evidence concerning the testimony of an undercover agent, the
biasing effect of that testimony was not eliminated.' 3 Thus, the ef-
fect of judicial instructions concerning evidential matters is as un-
clear as the effect of other types ofjudical instructions.
Although it is difficult to predict the manner in which caution-
ary instructions about eyewitness testimony will affect juror behav-
ior, some research suggests that such instructions might have
relatively limited impact. They are likely to be presented at the end
of the trial, long after the jurors have reached a decision about the
defendant's guilt or innocence. The testimony of a confident eye-
witness may seem especially compelling to a jury member, thereby
making its importance difficult to overcome. Finally, the judge may
phrase the cautionary instructions in relatively abstract and techni-
cal language that makes it difficult for ajury member to understand.
Indeed, Woocher concludes that "given the tremendous impact of
eyewitness testimony, it is doubtful that burying a paragraph or two
of instructions that focus the juror's attention on the identification
9 Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evi-
dence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977) (study with
mock juries).
10 Cornish & Sealy,Juries and Rules of Evidence, 17 CRIM. L. REV. 208 (1973).
11 See Doob, Evidence, Procedure and Psychological Research, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW
(G. Bermant, C. Nemeth & N. Vidmar eds. 1976); Doob & Kirschenbaum, Some Empirical
Evidence of the Effect of Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 GRIM. LAW
Q. 88 (1972).
12 Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Ju-
ries: A Moral Dilemma, J. APPLIED SoC. PSYCH. 344 (1973).
13 Wolfe & Montgomery, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence and Level ofJudicialAdmonishment
to Disregard the Judgment, 7J. APPLIED PSYCH. 205 (1977).
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issue can achieve the desired result of ensuring that the issue
receives careful consideration."' 4
III. METHODOLOGY
The research that documents several conditions under which
judicial instructions can be effective suggests the need for a direct
experimental test of this claim. Therefore, we exposed mock jury
members to a videotape burglary trial in which the eyewitness testi-
mony played a critical role in the prosecution's case. Jury members
were asked to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant
following one of three types ofjudicial instructions. In the first con-
dition, the judge gave the jurors their charge, instructed them about
their responsibilities and provided them with a careful explanation
of the crime of burglary. In the second condition, the judge gave
the jurors these standard instructions plus a recapitulation of the
evidence presented by the defense and prosecution counsels. In the
third condition, the judge provided the jurors with the standard in-
structions, a recapitulation of the evidence, and a formal judicial
commentary that contained the judge's evaluation of the evidence
presented, as well as a cautionary statement about the fallibility of
eyewitness identification, which was supported by relevant psycho-
logical research.
We measured several features of the jury decision-making pro-
cess and administered a post-decision questionnaire to gauge the
impact of the judical comments. From an analysis of these meas-
ures, this Article will assess the impact of cautionary instructions
about eyewitness testimony and clarify their implications for pro-
tecting accused individuals against faulty identifications.
One hundred and eight students from Reed College, Portland,
Oregon volunteered to participate.' 5 Each group ofjurors viewed a
forty minute video tape of a mock trial in which the defendant was
accused of burglarizing a warehouse. A key element in the prosecu-
tion's case was the eyewitness testimony of a police officer and an
innocent bystander, both of whom claimed that the defendant was
the individual they saw fleeing from the scene of the crime.
Following the video tape of the trial, each mock jury heard vari-
ous portions of an audio presentation of the judge's instructions.
The jurors were informed that this audio presentation represented
14 Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 1005 (1977).
15 Subjects ranged in age from 17-39 and represented a relatively diverse range of
backgrounds.
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the instructions from the trial transcript that had been inadvertently
omitted from the video recording. The jurors were exposed to one
of the following three conditions of judicial commentary:
1. Instruction Only: Jurors received a standard set of instruc-
tions that dealt with such topics as juror responsibility, function and
purpose, various types of evidence, an explanation and definition of
the first degree burglary charge and the burden of proof required in
this case. 16 The jurors then heard the indictment against the
defendant.'
7
2. Instruction + Summation: In addition to the standard in-
structions, the subjects in this condition received ajudicial recapitu-
lation of the evidence presented during the trial by counsels for the
defense and prosecution. The prosecution summation emphasized
the eyewitness identification of the defendant. The summation of
the case for the defense highlighted the testimony of an individual,
convicted earlier of participating in the crime, who testified that the
defendant was unknown to him and that he was not his accomplice
in the crime. The judicial summation emphasized the defendant's
testimony, who claimed he was walking home from a gathering of
friends on the night of the burglary. 18
16 See E. DEvITr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL (1970).
17 At approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 1, 1980, the Radio World Warehouse
was broken into and an undiscernible amount of money was removed.
The police were summoned to the scene in response to a report of a possible bur-
glary in progress. Upon their arrival, they viewed two men fleeing the scene of the
crime. Both men were reported as white and of medium build. One allegedly had
brown hair and was wearing a blue denim jacket.
An innocent bystander, Mr. Michael Adams, standing in a restaurant parking lot
approximately a block away reportedly viewed and overheard the attempted arrest. He
subsequently tackled one of the fleeing criminals whom he released after the individual
pleaded innocence of crime. Later that evening, the defendant, Mr. Michael Jackson,
was arrested as a suspect in the crime. Mr. Adams subsequently was contacted by the
police to view a possible suspect, whereupon he identified Michael Jackson as the indi-
vidual he had apprehended.
18 The judicial summation was as follows:
Witnesses for the Prosecution:
Officer Thomas Walters: Officer Walters has testified that on the evening of De-
cember 1, 1980, he was summoned in response to a report of a possible burglary in
progress at the Radio World Warehouse. Upon arriving, he testified that he observed
two white males fleeing from the scene; one with brown hair and a blue denim jacket.
He has identified the defendant MichaelJackson as the individual so described with what
he testifies as "not absolute, but reasonable certainty."
Mr. Michael Adams: Mr. Adams has testified that on the evening of December 1, he
was standing in the parking lot of the Pizza Hut Restaurant, one block from the Radio
World Warehouse. He has stated that he saw the squad car, heard voices, and tackled a
man fleeing from the scene, releasing him when the man pleaded innocence of any
wrongdoing. Mr. Adams later was contacted by the police department to come in and
1985]
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3. Instruction + Summation + Commentary: The jurors in
this condition received the same instructions and summation as in
the previous group, plus the judge's evaluation of the evidence
presented during the trial and his commentary on the fallibility of
eyewitness identification. This commentary questioned the eyewit-
ness testimony against the defendant and reviewed some of the psy-
chological issues (e.g., the role of stress, lighting conditions,
duration of observation, etc.) generally involved in eyewitness
identification. 19
view a suspect in this case. At that time, and again here in this courtroom, Mr. Adams
has identified the defendant Michael Jackson as the individual he tackled fleeing from
the scene of the crime.
Witnesses for the defense:
Mr. Allan James: Mr. James has admitted to being one of the persons involved in
the burglary, and has been convicted of the crime so charged. He has testified that he
does not know the defendant, Michael Jackson, and that he was not his accomplice in
this crime. He has further testified that, on the evening of December 1, 1980, he was not
tackled and detained by a bystander while fleeing from the crime.
Mr. MichaelJackson: Mr.Jackson, the defendant in this case, has testified that he is
not guilty of this criminal offense, and that on the night of December 1, 1980, he was at
Charlie's Bar on the corner ofJulie and Kielo Avenues with some friends. He further
testified that after leaving the bar at about 7:00, he went to a party where he stayed until
9:00. Between the hours of nine and eleven, he testified that he walked through a
nearby park, stopped at a Stop & Go, and shortly after 11:00 left his friends and began
to walk and hitch-hike home when he was arrested by the police. Finally, Mr. Jackson
has testified that during his walk home, he was not tackled or in any way detained by the
witness for the prosecution, Mr. Adams.
19 The actual judicial commentary included the following remarks:
I would now like to add some of my own comments on this case. I want you to
remember though that this is only my opinion and it is up to you to accept or disre-
gard it. First, I will comment on the weight which I feel that evidence in this case
should be given.
The first piece of evidence is the denim jacket worn by the defendant, Michael
Jackson. It is a rather common piece of outerwear, worn by a good portion of our
community. I feel that it is an important point to take into consideration.
Secondly, the prosecution's witness, Michael Adams, testified that he can accu-
rately identify the defendant, yet he viewed the individual he tackled for two to
three minutes under poor lighting conditions, and stated that the man he held down
"did not have any distinctive features," and had "a normal everyday face."
I will now offer my opinion on some of the psychological issues involved in
eyewitness identification.
Eyewitness testimony has long been an issue of considerable psychological de-
bate. Since 1908, studies on perception have repeatedly shown our abilities to per-
ceive, retain, and retrieve information to be amazingly limited even under the most
"ideal" of conditions.
Most recent studies have introduced a third element to our understanding of
human perception, "stress." It has been repeatedly demonstrated that stressful
conditions can further limit our abilities to accurately "perceive" and retain infor-
mation about perceived events. This is not to say, however, that one should be
inalterably antagonistic towards eyewitness testimony. Eyewitness identification has
been, and continues to be one of the most powerful forms of evidence introduced in
a court of law. It commands respect and we should give our eyewitness our most
concentrated attention. But with this attention and consideration, we should be
mindful of the inherent limitations in human perception, taking into consideration
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Following their exposure to the video trial transcript and the
audio judicial instructions, the jurors received a copy of the indict-
ment and made a pre-deliberation decision about the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant. Then they deliberated as a group until they
reached a verdict. 20 Finally, each participant was asked to complete




Table 1, which indicates the major findings of this study, lists
the pre-deliberation verdicts of the individuals in each of the three







MEASURE Only Summation Commentary
Individual
Pre-deliberation Verdict
Guilty 17 12 7
Not Guilty 43 48 53
Mean Jury Deliberation Time 23 min. 16.5 min. 9.6 min.
Number of Hung Juries 2 1 0
Number of Guilty Verdicts 8 9 10
occurred in the Instruction Only condition, where seventeen indi-
viduals reached such a decision before they had a chance to discuss
it with the other members of the jury. This was followed by twelve
all the circumstantial conditions of the eyewitness's perception. Lighting condi-
tions, length of time for the observation, distance and the emotional state to the
perceiver must all be considered in our evaluation of the "facts" presented here.
Our witness has testified that he is certain of his identification-for all intents and
purposes, he has no reason to lie. He is an upstanding young citizen who came to
the aid of our police. What is up to you as ajury to determine, with due considera-
tion of the conditions of his perception, is whether his identification (by far the
strongest point of evidence presented in this case) is credible enough to convict the
defendant, Michael Jackson, of burglary in the first degree.
That is all I will say, but remember that these comments were just my opinion
and you are the sole determiners of the facts and of the reliability to be given the
witness and the weight of the evidence.
20 A majority of 5 to I was required to reach a verdict in all juries.
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pre-deliberation guilty verdicts in the Instruction + Summation
condition and only seven in the Instruction + Summation + Com-
mentary group. An overall Chi square test revealed that the differ-
ences between these groups were marginally significant (x2=4.04,
p < .10), suggesting a trend of decreasing likelihood of a pre-delib-
eration judgment of guilt with increasing degrees of information.
Pairwise comparisons between the groups indicated that there were
significantly fewer pre-deliberation guilty verdicts (x2=5.2, p< .05)
in the Instruction + Summation + Commentary group than in the
Instruction Only group. This was the only significant difference be-
tween the groups on this measure.
B. DELIBERATION TIME
Table 1 lists the mean deliberation time under each condition
and indicates that these trends also were reflected in the time it took
the juries to reach a verdict. While the Instruction Only group took
an average of 23 minutes to reach a verdict, the Instruction + Sum-
mation jurors took an average of 16.5 minutes. The mock jury
groups exposed to the Instruction + Summation + Commentary
spent the least amount of time deliberating, taking an average of
only 9.6 minutes to reach a verdict. An analysis of variance of the
differences between the groups on this measure was highly signifi-
cant (F=7.68, p.<.0006). Clearly, the more information the jurors
received, the quicker they reached a verdict. Moreover, the Instruc-
tion + Summation + Commentary groups took significantly less
time to deliberate than both the Instruction Only (t=3.54, p<
.0009) and the Instruction + Summation Group (t= 3.6, p < .0008).
The Instruction Only and Instruction + Summation groups did not
differ significantly.
C. GROUP VERDICT
Table 1 shows that virtually all of the juries concluded that the
defendant was innocent of the burglary charge, with 27 of 30 reach-
ing a not guilty verdict. No jury judged the defendant guilty and
only three juries were hung, which meant that they were unable to
arrive at the 5-1 majority required to reach a verdict. Table 1 indi-
cates that two of the hung juries were exposed to the Instruction
Only condition while the remaining one was exposed to the Instruc-
tion + Summation condition. There were no hung juries in the In-
struction + Summation + Commentary condition. Although the
data suggests that an increasing amount of judicial commentary in-
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fluenced the juries' final verdicts, there was no significant difference
between the groups on this measure.
D. QUESTIONNAIRE
Each juror was asked to consider a number of issues connected
with the trial on the post-deliberation questionnaire. There were no
consistent differences between the groups on any of the questions.
For example, individuals in the three conditions evaluated the
videotape trial and overall quality of the lawyers' performances in
basically the same positive fashion. In addition, the groups could
not be distinguished in terms of the significance they attached to
several evidential matters, such as the testimony of the previously
convicted defense witness, which they considered of minor impor-
tance, or to the material connected with the eyewitness identifica-
tions, which they uniformly considered much more important. In
addition, it is noteworthy that the groups did not differ in terms of
the importance they attached to the judge's instructions in guiding
their final verdict, although they attached somewhat greater overall
importance to this source than they did to their jury peers.
V. DIscusSION
These findings demonstrate that judicial instructions have a sig-
nificant influence on several dimensions of the jury decision-making
process. A set of standard judicial instructions, a statement combin-
ing these instructions with a summary of the trial evidence, and one
where each of these statements was combined with a comment on
eyewitness testimony exerted progressively greater influence on
members of thejury. It led them to make fewer and fewer pre-delib-
eration guilty verdicts, to deliberate for less and less time and to
display a trend toward a reduced likelihood of reaching a hung or
guilty final verdict.
These findings also indicate that the condition which exerted
the greatest influence was the one that included all three sets ofju-
dicial instructions. The group that was exposed to the standard set
of jury instructions in combination with a summary of the trial evi-
dence did not differ significantly from the group that was exposed to
the Instruction Only condition on any of the measures of judicial
decision making. In contrast, the group that was exposed to these
two sets of instructions, as well as instructions that focused on the
psychological factors involved in eyewitness identifications, differed
significantly from both other groups in terms of jury deliberation
time and from the Instruction Only group in terms of the number of
1985]
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pre-deliberation guilty verdicts. They were also the only group that
always voted to acquit the accused. The current study therefore re-
futes the claim that embedding such instructions about several is-
sues involved in eyewitness testimony in a long list of other
instructions would have very little, if any, impact on juror
behavior.
2 1
It is important to recognize that these effects were observed in a
trial where there was a weak case against the defendant. Forty-three
of the sixty subjects (71%) in the Instruction Only conditionjudged
the defendant not guilty prior to the jury deliberation and after de-
liberating, only two out of ten (20%) of the juries in this condition
were hung, and none voted to convict. Judicial commentary might
be expected to exert even greater impact in a case with a higher base
rate of conviction. Future research should select a case in which at
least half, and perhaps an even higher percentage ofjuries, voted to
convict.
These results are similar to recent findings on the effect of dis-
crediting the testimony of an eyewitness. 22 Two of the experiments
in that study included a condition where jurors were exposed to ju-
dicial cautions about the fallibility of eyewitness identification. In
our experiments such an admonition generally lowered the percent-
age of guilty verdicts. In both experiments, however, this appeared
to hold only in the discredited, as distinguished from the credible,
eyewitness conditions. Thus, when eyewitness testimony appeared
to be reliable, judicial cautionary instructions had no effect on the
verdicts rendered by the mock jurors.23 Future research on judicial
admonitions about eyewitness testimony hopefully will help to clar-
ify the basis for the difference between these studies.
The current study also is conceptually similar to recent research
on the influence of expert testimony about eyewitness identifica-
tions on juror-behavior. 24 Two recent experiments report that the
21 See Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 13.
22 See D. SAUNDERS, N. VIDMAR & E. HEWETr, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY AND THE Dis-
CREDITING EFFECT (S. Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983).
23 The case against the defendant in their simulated trials appeared much stronger
than it was in our burglary trial, with a much higher base rate of guilty convictions.
Further, their trial materials were presented in written, rather than videotape, format.
Their subjects also worked individually and never deliberated as a group. Also, they
included a discredited witness condition, whereas we did not. Unfortunately, the ab-
sence of any empirical research on eyewitness cautionary instructions makes it impossi-
ble to know which of these factors, either alone or in combination, could be responsible
for the differences between their credible eyewitness condition and ours.
24 Expert testimony has the same goal as judicial cautionary instructions. Both are
intended to inform jurors about the current research on the fallibility of eyewitnesses
and some of the variables that might produce faulty identifications.
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presence of expert psychological testimony in mock jury trials re-
duced the frequency of guilty verdicts and increased jury delibera-
tion time. 25 Thus, expert testimony and judicial admonition have
similar effects with respect to diminishing the likelihood of guilty
verdicts. They differ, however, in their impact on deliberation time.
While expert testimony seems to increase the length ofjury deliber-
ation, judicial admonitions reduce it. The limited research in this
area makes it difficult to interpret both the reliability and source of
this possible discrepancy. Expert testimony may increase jurors'
doubt about fallible eyewitness identification and therefore lead
them to spend more time discussing this topic. On the other hand,
perhaps similar information from the prestigious judge, which is not
subject to a critical cross-examination, tends to resolve their doubts.
Presently, this issue remains unresolved, but it is surely one which
deserves to be explored in greater detail.
Many individuals have voiced concern about the disproportion-
ate influence that an expert witness or judge might have on jurors.26
Those who make such claims argue that a judicial admonition about
eyewitness testimony might too readily lead a juror to conclude that
a general statement about the factors governing eyewitness identifi-
cation implies that the particular identification made in the trial was
unreliable. 27 This concern is perhaps the major reason many juris-
dictions in this country do not permit the trial judge to summarize
evidence, let alone comment or caution jurors in any way about the
evidence. 28
This contrasts with the far more active role that the judiciary
plays in Great Britain in cautioning jurors in disputed identity cases.
These procedures were instituted following the well-known report
of Lord Chief Justice Devlin that concluded that faulty eyewitness
identifications were a major source of erroneous convictions and
that such miscarriage of justice could be reduced greatly if judges
25 Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on
Jury Decisions, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287 (1980); Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testi-
mony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identiication, 65 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 9 (1980).
26 The commentators fear that a group of relatively uninformed individuals might be
unduly swayed by a forceful and articulate expert or judge.
27 At the same time, these scholars suggest that a group of lay persons might not
otherwise reach a conclusion in the absence of such a persuasive and authoritative
statement.
28 But see CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-216 (West Supp.
1984); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 768.29 (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 300.10(2) (McKinney 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. 15A-1232 (1983). See also Note, Remov-
ing Temptation: Per se Reversal for Judicial Indication of Belief in the Defendant's
Guilt, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333, 1338 (1985).
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warned jurors about this possibility. 2 9 Accordingly, it delineated the
following guidelines for judges to use when cautioning jurors:
First, whenever the case against an accused depended wholly or sub-
stantially on the correctness of one or more identifications of the ac-
cused which the defense alleged to be mistaken, the judge should warn
the jury of the special need for caution before convicting in reliance on
the correctness of the identification. In addition, he should . . . make
some reference to the possibility that a mistaken witness could be a
convincing one and that a number of such witnesses could all be mis-
taken ....
Secondly, the judge should direct the jury to examine closely the
circumstances in which the identification by each witness came to be
made. How long did the witness have the accused under observation?
At what distance? In what light? Was the observation impeded in any
way, e.g., by passing traffic or a press of people? Had the witness ever
seen the accused before? How often? If only occasionally, had he any
special reason for remembering the accused? How long a time had
elapsed between the original observation and the subsequent identifi-
cation to the police? Was there any material discrepancy between the
description of the accused given by the witness when first seen by them
and his actual appearance?
Finally, the judge should remind the jury of any specific weak-
nesses which had appeared in the identification evidence .... [W]ere
the courts to judge otherwise, affronts to justice would occur
frequently.
3 0
These instructions are considerably more forceful and detailed
than any currently employed in the American legal system. Even the
model instructions set forth in Telfaire3 ' only generally call the ju-
rors' attention to the issues surrounding eyewitness identification.
Even those jurisdictions that permit judicial comment on evidence
probably would be reluctant to require such a forceful admonition
about the limitations of eyewitness testimony. Kalven and Zeisel
note that in those few states that permit the judge to summarize and
comment on the evidence, judges do so in only one-third of the tri-
als in which such a procedure is allowed. 3 2 Thus, in this country, it
is still the defense counsel who must assume the major responsibil-
ity for focusing the jurors' attention on the identification issue.
29 P. DEVLIN, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT OF THE
DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, London) (1976).
30 Id.
31 Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
32 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY (1966).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The sharp contrast between the British and American ap-
proaches to judicial instructions raises a fundamental question as to
whether these instructions can provide a genuine safeguard against
faulty eyewitness identification. Unfortunately, there is limited re-
search available to help answer this question. This Article demon-
strates that information in the form of a judicial summary of
evidence and a comment about eyewitness identification can influ-
ence jurors. The effects that we observed may reflect a clearer un-
derstanding on the part of the jurors of the facts in the case and a
more accurate appraisal of their relevance in determining the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. On the other hand, these instruc-
tions may curtail the kind of critical reasoning that should be under-
taken in order to resolve any reasonable doubts about the
defendant's guilt. It is important for such comments to enhance the
jurors' understanding of the case, without at the same time short-
circuiting the normal deliberation process. While judicial admoni-
tions should encourage careful analysis of the relevant issues,
judges also should avoid producing .an excessively cautious deci-
sion-making process. The overall effectiveness ofjudicial comments
in reducing the likelihood of mistaken convictions must be evalu-
ated in terms of their success in striking a balance between these
objectives.
Lastly, the impact of judicial instructions varies widely: some-
times they are followed, sometimes they are not, and often they have
little or no effect on jury behavior. Therefore, there is no guarantee
that a specific judicial comment will play a major role in the jury
decision-making process. In the final analysis, that is not its func-
tion. Rather, such instructions simply should seek to focus the ju-
rors' attention on certain issues and their relevance to the trial.
Once we know ifjudicial admonitions do accomplish that objective,
we will be better able to determine the extent to which they are ef-
fective in protecting the innocent.
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